Under Article III of the Constitution, a plaintiff must have standing in order to bring a suit in federal court. To establish standing, the plaintiff must have “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.”¹Constitutional standing is a jurisdictional requirement, a defect in which can be challenged at any time, even on appeal.²In patent cases, the Federal Circuit has held that, “the touchstone of constitutional standing in a patent infringement suit is whether a party can establish that it has an exclusionary right in a patent.”³As long as the plaintiff can show that it “holds at least one exclusionary right,” it will have standing.^[4]

The precise meaning and application of the exclusionary-right requirement remain subjects of ongoing debate. Many district courts have applied it in their constitutional standing analysis,⁵ but not consistently. This article traces the development of the requirement and reviews how courts have applied it in recent cases. This review seeks to provide parties and practitioners guidance on establishing or challenging a plaintiff’s possession of “exclusionary right” required to show standing.

What is an “exclusionary right”?

The concept of “exclusionary right” standing originated in pre-Lexmark⁶case law. Federal Circuit cases in that era often discussed standing as a broader threshold that encompass both (1) constitutional standing and (2) standing that derives from the statutory requirement (35 U.S.C. § 281) that only a “patentee” can sue for patent infringement. One of the pre-Lexmark cases first introducing the exclusionary-right requirement is Morrow,⁷a case from 2007. Morrow remains an often-cited source for “exclusionary right” and has been credited as the closest the Federal Circuit has come to defining it.⁸

Morrow addressed whether a liquidating trust that shared certain rights to a patent upon the original patentee’s liquidation had standing to sue for infringement. The court reviewed the allocation of patent rights between different trusts under the liquidation plan and what rights the plaintiff trust obtained. In that context, the court explained, because “the patent statutes give rise to the right to sue others for patent infringement, they also define the nature and source of the infringement claim and determine the party that is entitled to judicial relief.”⁹The court then turned to what rights are granted under the patent statute.

“A patent grant,” the court continued, “bestows the legal right to exclude others from making, using, selling, or offering to sell the patented invention in the United States, or importing the invention,” namely, the “right to exclude.”¹⁰So according to the court, a “[c]onstitutional injury in fact occurs when a party performs at least one prohibited action with respect to the patented invention that violates these exclusionary rights.”¹¹In WiAV, the court reiterated that “the legally protected interests in a patent are the exclusionary rights created by the Patent Act.”¹²

Seemingly straightforward, the contours of “exclusionary rights” remain to be defined. Case law has not established a complete list of “exclusionary rights.”¹³In practice, courts’ exclusionary-right analyses examine relevant provisions of the rightallocating agreement(s) at issue.¹⁴They then look to prior cases addressing similar contractual arrangements or restrictions. Consequently, the exclusionary right inquiry has become a factintensive exercise involving contract interpretation and an evolving body of case law.

“Exclusionary rights” v. “substantial rights”

The Federal Circuit has repeatedly warned against conflating the “exclusionary right” required for constitutional standing and “substantial rights” for the “patentee” requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 281. Under § 281, only a “patentee” can sue for patent infringement, who can be the patent owner, or a party that obtained all “substantial rights” to the patent.¹⁵This requirement is also referred to as statutory standing, or the statutory cause of action.

The separation between the two inquiries is significant, because the Supreme Court’s Lexmark¹⁶decision mandated that a plaintiff’s statutory cause of action, unlike constitutional standing, is not a jurisdictional requirement. Following that guidance, in Lone Star, the Federal Circuit held that “whether a party possesses all substantial rights in a patent does not implicate standing or subject-matter jurisdiction.”¹⁷A defect in statutory standing can be cured after the suit commences, but a defect in constitutional standing cannot.¹⁸Lone Star, however, does not address whether “exclusionary right” remains the requirement for constitutional standing.¹⁹Recent decisions from the court have continued to apply the exclusionary-right requirement for constitutional standing, so it remains the law.

Pre-Lexmark standing decisions, however, continue to operate in both the “exclusionary rights” and “substantial rights” analysis, and not consistently. In Fujifilm, for instance, the Federal Circuit addressed the § 281 “patentee” requirement and cited Mann,²⁰a pre-Lexmark decision addressing whether a licensor transferred all substantial rights to the licensee and thereby rendered the licensee the patent owner.²¹The court reiterated Mann’s discussion of several rights that should be examined in the “substantial rights” inquiry. The same Mann decision was later cited by the Federal Circuit in Zebra to support the conclusion that others’ shared ability to license did not divest the patent owner “of all exclusionary rights” for constitutional standing purposes.²²In Uniloc I, the patent owner also relied on Mann and another pre-Lexmark case to argue (unsuccessfully) that it retained constitutional standing despite granting a license and a right to sublicense.²³The patent owner appealed, but the Federal Circuit resolved the case on collateral estoppel grounds.²⁴

The inconsistency similarly exists in district court cases. In a recent case, Recor Medical, the Norther District of California noted courts’ different views on whether the Federal Circuit’s Mann decision was relevant or instructive for the exclusionary-right inquiry.²⁵ The court ultimately concluded that, in its view, the Mann analysis was more instructive for the substantial-rights analysis and rejected patent owner’s reliance on Mann to show constitutional standing. In contrast, in CEMCO, the Western District of Washington addressed challenges as to both “substantial rights” under § 281 and “exclusionary rights” for constitutional standing.²⁶Relying on primarily pre-Lexmark law, including Mann, the court reviewed the rights transferred under the license at issue and found the plaintiff retained “substantial rights.”²⁷That analysis was then incorporated into the court’s constitutional standing inquiry, to support the conclusion that the plaintiff retained “exclusionary rights.”²⁸Similarly, in Ingenus, the Northern District of Illinois applied primarily pre-Lexmark law in its “exclusionary rights” and “sufficient rights” analysis and found Mann instructive for both.²⁹

Fundamentally, the concept of an “exclusionary right” derives from the rights granted under the patent statute. So does any right encompassed by the “substantial rights” in a patent. The statutory basis is the same, and the scope of the two are at least overlapping. Nonetheless, pending further clarification from the Federal Circuit, parties should remain mindful of post-Lexmark cases directed to one as opposed to the other. That applies particularly to cases decided by district courts that have explicitly held that certain case law pertains to one and not the other.

“Exclusionary right” and the three constitutional-standing elements

The exclusionary-right inquiry differs from the traditional threeelement constitutional standing analysis. Some recent decisions focus only on the exclusionary-right inquiry, without separately discussing the three traditional elements.³⁰Courts appear satisfied that owning an exclusionary right means that infringement would cause an injury, and that this injury can be redressed by judicial relief, so all three elements are met.

The Federal Circuit’s early discussions of exclusionary rights, however, pertained specifically to the injury-in-fact analysis. In Morrow, the court stated that constitutional injury-in-fact occurred when one party’s action violated another party’s exclusionary rights.³¹The court noted that it only discussed injuryinfact without reaching the other two elements (causation and redressability), because injury alone was dispositive in that case.³²In Lone Star, the court found the plaintiff sufficiently alleged possession of exclusionary rights, infringement of which resulted in injury.³³For the other two elements, the court simply stated that “it is clear that a court could redress an injury caused by that infringement.”³⁴

Confusion as to the connection between exclusionary rights and the traditional constitutional injury-in-fact persists. For instance, although monetary harm “readily qualif[ies] as concrete injury under Article III,”³⁵how monetary harm factors into the exclusionary-right analysis remains to be clarified. In In re Cirba, the appellant disputed whether an exclusionary right was necessary for a “concrete injury,” and whether a monetary-harm-based “competitive” injury would suffice.³⁶That question came to the Federal Circuit in a writ of mandamus petition, and the court denied it under the high mandamus standard without resolving the question. A similar issue arose in Vericool, and the district court found the harm to the plaintiff’s monetary interest plainly satisfied the injury requirement.³⁷Other cases, in contrast, have focused only on the exclusionary-right analysis without considering monetary harm as a basis for Article III injury.³⁸

Given the ongoing debate, parties may find it beneficial to discuss all three elements in conjunction with the exclusionary-right requirement. In CEMCO, for instance, the court found that the plaintiff suffered an injury based on its retained exclusionary rights in the asserted patents.³⁹In addition to the injury element, the defendant also disputed whether the injury was speculative and whether it was redressable. The court, in turn, addressed each in its analysis.

Who may have an exclusionary right?

Courts have cautioned that constitutional standing does not depend on whether a plaintiff is designated as a patentee, licensee, or otherwise.⁴⁰But the types of plaintiffs do matter, as courts’ exclusionary-right inquiries differ depending on whether the plaintiff is a patent owner/licensor, or a licensee or transferee of certain rights in a patent. We divide our discussion below accordingly.

Patent Owners/Licensors

According to the Federal Circuit, a patent owner has “exclusionary rights as a baseline matter unless it has transferred all exclusionary rights away.”⁴¹In Zebra, the court held that a patent owner did not lose all exclusionary rights because another entity shared the ability to license.⁴²In Lowe, the court reiterated the same and held that the assignee had “an exclusionary right sufficient to establish Article III standing even if [it granted another party a non-exclusive license with] an unrestricted right to sublicense.”⁴³

In these cases, the Federal Circuit’s reasoning focused on the rights that were transferred away, and whether those rights amounted to all exclusionary rights and left the patent owner with none. Several recent district court cases, in contrast, examined each right the patent owner allegedly retained to determine whether any of them was an exclusionary right. For instance, in Recor Medical⁴⁴and Deere,⁴⁵the district courts analyzed each right the patent owner/licensor alleged to have retained but found none to be an exclusionary right.

The right to sue for infringement continues to be an important factor, but courts’ views vary. In Deere, for instance, the Southern District of Iowa interpreted the Federal Circuit’s Morrow decision as establishing that “the right to initiate a patent enforcement action is not an exclusionary right supportive of constitutional standing.”⁴⁶The court then found the plaintiffs’ asserted enforcement rights insufficient to support constitutional standing.

The Northern District of California followed similar reasoning in Recor Medical.⁴⁷Under the licensing agreement in that case, the patent owner had a right to sue for infringement if the licensee declined to or failed to do so within a reasonable time. The court found this “secondary right to sue” depended on the licensee’s exclusionary rights and was not itself an exclusionary right.⁴⁸The court also rejected the patent owner’s reliance on Mann and found Mann “more instructive for a statutory standing analysis.”⁴⁹

Other courts took a different view. In Ingenus, the Northern District of Illinois acknowledged that Mann concerned the transfer of substantial rights for statutory standing purposes, but it found Mann‘s right-to-sue analysis nonetheless instructive.⁵⁰Comparing to Mann, the court concluded that under the licensing agreement at issue, the licensor’s “right to sue [was] stronger,” and the licensee’s “right to sublicense [was] just as fettered.”⁵¹The court noted that, among other things, the licensor was the only entity that could initiate a patent infringement action, and that the licensee was required to pay the licensor a portion of sublicensing profits. The court concluded that the licensor retained the “exclusionary right to sue for infringement” and thus had constitutional standing.⁵²Similarly, the District of Massachusetts in Chr. Hansen found that the licensor had constitutional standing because it “retained the right to sue, which [was] an exclusionary right.”⁵³

In addition to the right to sue, the court in Recor Medical, like the court in Deere, also considered other rights that the licensors retained but found none of them to be an exclusionary right. In Recor Medical, the court also discussed the patent owner’s retained rights to veto sublicense, to limit licensee’s transfer of its rights, and to terminate the agreement in case of a material breach.⁵⁴It found none of them to be an exclusionary right sufficient for constitutional standing. In Deere, similarly, the court also discussed other rights the patent owner allegedly retained, including: the rights to maintain patent registrations, the right to examine the quality of products practicing the asserted patents, the licensee’s grant-back of a non-exclusive license and the right to sublicense, and the alleged reversionary interests upon termination.⁵⁵The court found none of these rights to be an exclusionary right supportive of constitutional standing. The infringement claims in both cases were therefore dismissed.

It seems that the conflicting views again come down to the lack of a clear definition of “exclusionary right” and the inconsistent interpretations of pre-Lexmark case law. Several cases noted here are currently on appeal. As those appeals progress, the Federal Circuit may have an opportunity to provide further guidance and to address the divide among district courts.

Exclusive Licensees

The Federal Circuit has long recognized exclusive licensees as one category of plaintiffs having constitutional standing to sue. In WiAV, the court explained that, because exclusive licensees hold one or more exclusionary rights created under the patent statute, they suffer an injury when others violate those rights.⁵⁶

Having exclusionary rights, however, does not require an exclusive licensee to have the sole right to practice the patent. A licensor, for instance, may reserve the right to practice the patent. In Lone Star, the Federal Circuit held that licensee/transferee Lone Star had constitutional standing even though the transferor (and its affiliates) retained the right to practice the patents-at-issue and the right to “indulge” infringing activities by other entities.⁵⁷Similarly, in Flow, the Northern District of California rejected the defendant’s argument that the plaintiff-licensee lacked standing because the licensor reserved the right to practice the patent.⁵⁸The court explained that although such a reservation was relevant to the “patentee” requirement, “a plaintiff need not have a perfectly exclusive license to proceed as a party.”⁵⁹

An exclusive licensee also does not need to “be the only party with the ability to license the patent.”⁶⁰The fact that other entities share the right to grant future licenses does not necessarily defeat the exclusive licensee’s constitutional standing. In WiAV, for instance, WiAV held an exclusive license to practice the asserted patents in the field of wireless handsets, subject to earlier licenses and third-parties’ right to grant future licenses. The court found that WiAV did not lack constitutional standing “merely because its license [was] subject not only to rights in existence at the time of the license but also to future licenses that may be granted only to parties other than the accused.”⁶¹

Importantly, as the court stressed, an exclusive licensee’s constitutional standing is defendant-specific and depends on the scope of its exclusivity as prescribed in the license. To establish standing, the licensee must show that the relevant contractual arrangement gives it the right to exclude the defendant from entering its exclusive domain.⁶²If the defendant does not have and cannot obtain a license to practice the patent within the exclusive licensee’s exclusive domain, the exclusive licensee would suffer an injury by the defendant’s infringement.⁶³So the exclusive licensee would have standing to sue that defendant.

In Puma, for instance, the Delaware District Court dismissed an exclusive-licensee’s suit because it lacked standing to pursue infringement outside of its exclusivity pertaining to certain compounds.^[64There, the exclusive licensee, Puma, held exclusive rights to practice the asserted patents with respect to certain compounds, but not with respect to the accused infringing compound, osimertinib. As such, in the court’s view, Puma lacked exclusionary rights with respect to the alleged infringement based on the defendant’s osimertinib product. The court thus dismissed Puma as a plaintiff.

Other Right Holders/Transferees

Case law also has established that certain rights, by themselves, were insufficient to support the right holder’s standing. First, a mere right to practice a patent, a socalled “bare license,” is not an exclusionary right supportive of standing.⁶⁵Second, courts have also frowned upon premising standing on the grant of a mere right to sue infringers that is separate from any accompanying proprietary interest in the patent.⁶⁶ But as discussed above, what more is required is subject to debate.

Other considerations when asserting or challenging “exclusionary rights”

An exclusionary-right analysis may require tracing the chain of transfer and mapping out all parties with a stake in the patent. For plaintiffs, it is best to do the homework preemptively rather than risking dismissal. In Western Digital, five plaintiffs filed the suit as a group, asserting that the group together owned all substantial rights in the asserted patents.⁶⁷Facing a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs claimed that at least one company among the five entities owns the rights to each patent. The court dismissed the complaint, finding plaintiffs’ pleading to be insufficient and muddled as to whether any of them had standing to sue.

For a defendant, potential standing defects present a unique defense against infringement allegations, one that can be raised at any time.⁶⁸It is important to examine allegations and evidence relating to each named plaintiff’s purported rights and interests in the asserted patent, and whether each has the required exclusionary right necessary for constitutional standing.

In Midwest Energy, the court dismissed, post-trial, a co-plaintiff because it lacked exclusionary rights in the asserted patents, and the court removed it from the previously entered judgments of infringement.⁶⁹The court rejected the co-plaintiff’s “one-plaintiff rule” argument that so long as one plaintiff has constitutional standing, then the other plaintiff’s standing need not be considered. In the court’s view, the application of the “one-plaintiff” rule is discretionary, and it is not warranted in a case between two private parties concerning patent infringement claims for monetary damages.

Further, developing a potential standing challenge may involve reviewing previous transfers of rights and analyzing how they may have affected the rights later transferred to the named plaintiff(s). In Applications in Internet Time, for instance, the defendant moved to dismiss based, in part, on a lack of constitutional standing because the assignment of patent rights to the plaintiff was void.⁷⁰Reviewing previous agreements, the court determined that the assignor had already sold the asserted patents to another party, so its later assignment to the plaintiff was null and void. Therefore, the court concluded, the plaintiff obtained no exclusionary rights and lacked constitutional standing.

Notably, although constitutional standing defects can be challenged at any time, the applicable standard of proof changes depending on the stage of the suit. At the pleading stage, a plaintiff may only need to plausibly plead its possession of exclusionary rights to survive a dismissal. If the suit proceeds to later stages such as summary judgment or trial, the plaintiff must adduce sufficient evidence to establish standing under the respective evidentiary standards applicable at those later stages.

The allocation and transfer of the rights and interests in a patent can take myriad forms. The exclusionary-right inquiry often involves interpreting intricate contractual arrangements and finding supporting cases that address rights with a similar scope or restrictions. As case law continues to evolve, parties should stay informed of new guidance from the Federal Circuit and be mindful of differing approaches taken by district courts.

Endnotes

1. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016).

2. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 434 (2011).

3. WiAV Sols. LLC v. Motorola, Inc., 631 F.3d 1257, 1265 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Univ. of S. Fla. Rsch. Found., Inc. v. Fujifilm Med. Sys. U.S.A., Inc., 19 F.4th 1315, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“Fujifilm”).

4. Fujifilm, 19 F.4th at 1324; Intell. Tech LLC v. Zebra Techs. Corp., 101 F.4th 807, 813–14 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (“All that requires here is that [the plaintiff] retained an exclusionary right—i.e., infringement would amount to an invasion of [the plaintiff’s] legally protected interest.”), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 568 (2024).

5. At least one court, has questioned the soundness of premising Article III standing on the exclusionary-right requirement. In Vericool,the court found that the plaintiff had Article III standing based on the harm to its pecuniary interest, “[a] quintessential injury in fact[.]” Vericool World LLC v. TemperPack Techs., Inc., 739 F. Supp. 3d 322, 334 (E.D. Va. 2024). The court observed that “a party can suffer financial harm from a patent infringer even if that party holds no exclusionary rights in the patent itself.” Id. To the court, “[p]atent infringement is not so sui generis as to require its own special Article III analysis, nor could the Patent Act lawfully command such an outcome.” Id.

6. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014).

7. Morrow v. Microsoft Corp., 499 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

8.See, e.g., Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, LLC, No. CV 17-1658-CFC, 2020 WL 7771219, at *5 n.2 (D. Del. Dec. 30, 2020) (“Uniloc I“), aff’d, 52 F.4th 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2022).

9. Morrow, 499 F.3dat 1339.

10. Id.; see 35 U.S.C. §§ 154, 271.

11. Morrow, 499 F.3dat 1339(emphasis added).

12. WiAV, 631 F.3d at 1264.

13. See, e.g., Uniloc I, 2020 WL 7771219, at *3 (noting the “inconsistent rulings about the meaning and scope of the right to exclude” and case law “lack[ing] coherence and breed[ing] confusion”), *5 (noting that “the scope of a patent’s exclusionary rights is subject to debate”).

14. See, e.g., IngenusPharms., LLC v. Nexus Pharms., Inc., No. 22-CV-02868, 2025 WL 1311271, at *3–*4 (N.D. Ill. May 6, 2025); Deere & Co. v. Kinze Mfg., Inc., 683 F. Supp. 3d 904, 920–25 (S.D. Iowa 2023).

15. See, e.g., Lone Star Silicon Innovations LLC v. Nanya Tech. Corp., 925 F.3d 1225, 1229 (Fed. Cir. 2019).

16. Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 128 n.4.

17. Lone Star, 925 F.3d at 1235–36.

18. See, e.g., id. at 1238.

19. See In re Cirba Inc., No. 2021-154, 2021 WL 4302979, at *3 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 22, 2021) (observing that “[i]t was not clear” that Lexmark and Lone Star required the court to alter its holding that constitutional standing rested on the possession of an exclusionary right).

20. Alfred E. Mann Found. For Sci. Rsch. v. Cochlear Corp., 604 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2010).

21. Fujifilm, 19 F.4th at 1320.

22. Zebra, 101 F.4th at 816 (emphasis in original).

23. See Uniloc I, 2020 WL 7771219, at *4.

24. Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility LLC, 52 F.4th 1340, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (observing that plaintiff-appellant’s standing argument had “considerable force”).

25. Recor Med., Inc. v. Medtronic Ireland Mfg. Unlimited Co., No. 22-CV-03072-TLT, 2025 WL 2272414, at *5–*6 (N.D. Cal. July 7, 2025).

26. CEMCO, LLC v. KPSI Innovations, Inc., No. C23-0918JLR, 2023 WL 7386699 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 8, 2023).

27. Id. at *3–*5.

28. Id. at *5.

29. Ingenus, 2025 WL 1311271, at *3–*6.

30. See, e.g., Lowe v. ShieldMark, Inc., No. 2023-1786, 2025 WL 893211, at *3 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 24, 2025) (noting that the plaintiff “has an exclusionary right sufficient to establish Article III standing”); Fujifilm, 19 F.4th at 1324 (“As we have held, constitutional standing is satisfied when a party holds at least one exclusionary right.”).

31. Morrow, 499 F.3d at 1339.

32. Id. at 1339 n.5.

33. Lone Star, 925 F.3d at 1234.

34. Id.

35. See, e.g., TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 425 (2021).

36. In re Cirba, 2021 WL 4302979, at *3.

37. Vericool, 739 F. Supp. 3d at 334.

38. See, e.g., Midwest Energy Emissions Corp. v. Arthur J. Gallagher & Co., No. CV 19-1334-CJB, 2025 WL 1884852, at *4 n.6 (D. Del. July 8, 2025) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that constitutional standing and its injury-in-fact requirement do not depend on possession of an exclusionary right).

39. CEMCO, 2023 WL 7386699, at *5–*6.

40. See, e.g.,Uniloc I, 2020 WL 7771219, at *5; see also Deere, 683 F. Supp. 3d at 914; Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., No. C 18-00358 WHA, 2020 WL 7122617 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2020) (find that plaintiff lacked standing despite its “continual self-characterization as the ‘patent owner,’ as though Article III standing appears at the utterance of a magic phrase”).

41. Zebra, 101 F.4th at 816.

42. Id.

43. Lowe, 2025 WL 893211, at *3.

44. Recor Med., 2025 WL 2272414, at *4–*6.

45. Deere, 683 F. Supp. 3d at 918–26; see also A.L.M. Holding Co. v. Zydex Indus. Priv. Ltd., No. 1:24-363-JPM, 2024 WL 5276676, at *5 (D. Del. Nov. 25, 2024).

46. Deere, 683 F. Supp. 3d at 921.

47. Recor Med., 2025 WL 2272414, at *4–*6.

48. Id. at *4.

49. Id. at *6.

50. Ingenus, 2025 WL 1311271, at *3–*4, *3 n.2.

51. Id. at *4.

52. Id.

53. Chr. Hansen HMO GmbH v. Glycosyn LLC, No. 22-CV-11090-NMG, 2025 WL 1071631, at *3 (D. Mass. Mar. 14, 2025), report and recommendation adopted as modified, No. CV 22-11090-NMG, 2025 WL 898301 (D. Mass. Mar. 24, 2025).

54. Recor Med., 2025 WL 2272414, at *6–*7.

55. Deere, 683 F. Supp. 3d at 920–25.

56. WiAV, 631 F.3d at 1264.

57. Lone Star, 925 F.3d at 1232, 1233.

58. Flow Devices & Sys., Inc. v. Pivotal Sys. Corp., 666 F. Supp. 3d 1024, 1031 (N.D. Cal. 2023).

59. Id.

60. WiAV, 631 F.3d at 1266 (emphasis in original).

61. Id. at 1267.

62. Id.

63. See, e.g., Glaston Corp. v. Salem Fabrication Techs. Grp., Inc., 744 F. Supp. 3d 430, 442 (M.D.N.C. 2024) (noting that, for standing purposes, exclusive licensing “require[d] that the exclusive licensee have the power to control which other entities engage in that business within their exclusionary domain”).

64. Puma Biotechnology, Inc. v. AstraZeneca Pharms. LP, 723 F. Supp. 3d 327, 340 (D. Del. 2024).

65. See, e.g., Propat Int’l Corp. v. Rpost, Inc., 473 F.3d 1187, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

66. See, e.g., Prima Tek II, L.L.C. v. A-Roo Co., 222 F.3d 1372, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Propat, 473 F.3d at 1194.

67. W. Digital Techs., Inc. v. Viasat, Inc., No. 22-CV-04376-HSG, 2023 WL 2989043, at *2, *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2023)

68. See, e.g., Pantech Corp. v. OnePlus Tech. (Shenzhen) Co., No. 5:22-CV-00069-RWS, 2024 WL 5510402, at *2–*5 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 20, 2024) (discussing constitutional standing issues raised at trial for the first time).

69. Midwest Energy,2025 WL 1884852,at *4–*6; see also Puma, 723 F. Supp. 3d at 340 (holding that a co-plaintiff “cannot seek relief in [the] suit unless it independently satisfies the requirements of Article III”).

70. Applications in Internet Time, LLC v. Salesforce, Inc., No. 3:13-CV-00628-MMD-CLB, 2025 WL 961656, at *3–*5 (D. Nev. Mar. 28, 2025).